PLAYING WITHOUT A RULEBOOK - OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT WHEN INDIVIDUALS LEARN THE PENALTY ONLY BY COMMITTING THE CRIME

Authors
BENSHAHAR O
Citation
O. Benshahar, PLAYING WITHOUT A RULEBOOK - OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT WHEN INDIVIDUALS LEARN THE PENALTY ONLY BY COMMITTING THE CRIME, International review of law and economics, 17(3), 1997, pp. 409-421
Citations number
17
Categorie Soggetti
Economics,Law
Journal title
International review of law and economics → ACNP
ISSN journal
01448188
Volume
17
Issue
3
Year of publication
1997
Pages
409 - 421
Database
ISI
SICI code
0144-8188(1997)17:3<409:PWAR-O>2.0.ZU;2-T