Rl. Gregory, KNOWLEDGE IN PERCEPTION AND ILLUSION, Philosophical transactions-Royal Society of London. Biological sciences, 352(1358), 1997, pp. 1121-1127
Following Hermann von Helmholtz, who described visual perceptions as u
nconscious inferences from sensory data and knowledge derived from the
past, perceptions are regarded as similar to predictive hypotheses of
science, but are psychologically projected into external space and ac
cepted as our most immediate reality. There are increasing discrepanci
es between perceptions and conceptions with science's advances, which
makes it hard to define 'illusion'. Visual illusions can provide evide
nce of object knowledge and working rules for vision, but only when th
e phenomena are explained and classified. A tentative classification i
s presented, in terms of appearances and kinds of causes. The large co
ntribution of knowledge from the past for vision raises the issue: how
do we recognize the present, without confusion from the past. This da
nger is generally avoided as the present is signalled by real-time sen
sory inputs-perhaps flagged by qualia of consciousness.