Do physicians have a duty to sustain the pregnancies of women who die
during the first or second trimester? Physicians cannot simply assume
that the woman would have wished the pregnancy to continue, nor (in th
e U. S., at any rate) is it clear that the state has any interest in f
etal life before viability. The conditions for beneficence-based dutie
s of fetal rescue will often be unmet, both because sustaining the pre
gnancy is not always a clear gain to the born child and because it may
impose a substantial burden on the benefactor. And duties of special
relationship cannot readily be applied in these cases, as it is diffic
ult to see how the relationship between someone who no longer exists a
nd someone who does not yet exist can breed special duties. Further, t
o draw on Marx's distinction between the architect, who builds purpose
fully, and the bee, who cannot help what she is doing, I argue that hu
man pregnancy is in a number of respects purposeful, creative, and del
iberate, and that postmortem pregnancy, which follows the model of the
bee, is a destructive icon that undercuts women's agency.