Over the past two decades, a vast body of literature has developed tha
t examines various penal reforms. However, several writers have argued
this literature is empirically weak and theoretically overgeneralized
. To advance the penal reform literature, it has been suggested that m
icro-studies informed by multiple theoretical frameworks be employed.
This study responds to this call by providing a case study of intermed
iate punishment. Specifically, the study explores a reform's origins,
operations, and outcomes, and how the motivations and activities of se
veral control agents impact this process. A major finding associated w
ith this reform effort is a ''piling up of sanctions.'' The ''piling u
p of sanctions'' exposes offenders to a number of punitive and rehabil
itative controls, which often leads to violations and returns to the c
orrectional system. To adequately interpret this and other reform proc
ess findings, several frameworks, including organizational, political
economy, and professional ideology, are necessary. In particular, Cohe
n's (1984) notion of ''deposits'' is useful in describing the relation
ships that underly the reform process.