AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH-MATCHING MODEL OF DISCRIMINATION

Authors
ROSEN A
Citation
A. Rosen, AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH-MATCHING MODEL OF DISCRIMINATION, European economic review, 41(8), 1997, pp. 1589-1613
Citations number
32
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
European economic review → ACNP
ISSN journal
00142921
Volume
41
Issue
8
Year of publication
1997
Pages
1589 - 1613
Database
ISI
SICI code
0014-2921(1997)41:8<1589:AESMOD>2.0.ZU;2-S
Abstract
A model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at th e hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome, even if no agents have a taste for discrimination and groups are ex ante identical. Groups which are discriminated agai nst (e.g., blacks, women) earn lower wages, and endure longer unemploy ment spells.