In a capitalist economy, prices serve to equilibrate supply and demand
for goods and services, continually changing to reallocate resources
to their most efficient uses. However, secondary stock market prices,
often viewed as the most '' informationally efficient '' prices in the
economy, have no direct role in the allocation of equity capital sinc
e managers have discretion in determining the level of investment. Wha
t is the link between stock price informational efficiency and economi
c efficiency? We present a model of the stock market in which: (i) man
agers have discretion in making investments and must be given the righ
t incentives; and (ii) stock market traders may have important informa
tion that managers do not have about the value of prospective investme
nt opportunities. In equilibrium, information in stock prices will gui
de investment decisions because managers will be compensated based on
informative stock prices in the future. The stock market indirectly gu
ides investment by transferring two kinds of information: information
about investment opportunities and information about managers' past de
cisions. However, because this role is only indirect, the link between
price efficiency and economic efficiency is tenuous. We show that sto
ck price efficiency is not sufficient for economic efficiency by showi
ng that the model may have another equilibrium in which prices are str
ong-form efficient, but investment decisions are suboptimal. We also s
uggest that stock market efficiency is not necessary for investment ef
ficiency by considering a banking system that can serve as an alternat
ive institution for the efficient allocation of investment resources.