AN ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

While economists have been studying the family as an economic unit for almost thirty years, most models have focused on cooperative family u nits. Domestic violence, one of the most widespread violent crimes aga inst women, is one example of a family unit that is better explained a s a noncooperative relationship. In this paper, a noncooperative model of domestic violence is presented. The comparative statics from this model predict that women's incomes and other financial support receive d from outside the marriage (family, welfare, shelters, divorce settle ments, etc.) will decrease the level of violence in intact families be cause they increase the woman's threat point. Implications of the theo retical model are discussed and empirical evidence is summarized. The results from existing and new analysis provide support for the hypothe sis that improved economic opportunities for women will decrease the l evel of violence in abusive relationships.