Soviet era firms provided generous social benefits, including health a
nd child care. Despite recent cuts, firm survey data show that benefit
s have remained a major component of total compensation. With benefits
largely firm-specific and firms dominated by insiders, continuing att
achment of workers as well as widespread informal sector participation
has resulted. This has impeded restructuring, in part by generating s
ignificant set-up costs for new private firms. We simulate the effects
of a cut in subsidies to benefits provision. We show that while this
leads to falls in benefits and employment and an increase in wages, th
e outcome critically depends on the availability of alternative provid
ers. The key to cushioning these adverse consequences is the stimulati
on of a market in benefits provision. Given initial conditions, rapid
removal of benefits supports will require transitional income support
to avoid under-consumption of these goods. We provide the design of a
simple scheme of transitional support and show that it can be financed
from the savings from removal of current subsidies to benefits.