NEGOTIATIONS IN MULTI-ISSUE COMMITTEES

We propose a non-cooperative bargaining approach to the problem of col lective decision making in committees by modelling this process as a s equential bargaining game. The main objective of the paper is to discu ss the formation of the agenda in multi-issue committees, and its rela tion to the importance of the issues. We start by asserting that in th e case of a single issue the set of all equilibrium outcomes of our ga me coincides with the set of coalitional stable outcomes. We then cons ider multi-issue committees to discuss the problem of forming agendas. We argue that from the point of view of efficiency and stability the most important issues should be put first on the agenda. We conclude w ith a sufficient condition (on players' preferences), which guarantees the efficiency and stability of the bargaining outcomes for every pos sible agenda. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.