EXPLAINING CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO REVERSE SUPREME-COURT DECISIONS

This research examines what factors are likely to cause the Congress t o attempt to reverse Supreme Court decisions that hold federal laws un constitutional during the Warren, Burger, and early years of the Rehnq uist courts. First, we outline a general theory of congressional motiv ation to reverse Supreme Court decisions that looks to both electoral considerations and the need to safeguard congressional power as the pr imary motivating factors. Using a data set consisting of 65 Court deci sions that reversed all or pan of some federal statute(s), we test our hypotheses using a probit model to predict when the Congress will tak e counteraction. We find that the electoral considerations of public o pinion and interest group pressure are likely to lead to a congression al response, while the institutional considerations of court unanimity and the age of the legislation struck down are also important. The co ngress, however, is most likely not to take any decision reversal acti on.