THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND NATO DEFENSE BURDENS - NEW EMPIRICAL TESTS

Authors
Citation
Jr. Oneal et Pf. Diehl, THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND NATO DEFENSE BURDENS - NEW EMPIRICAL TESTS, Political research quarterly, 47(2), 1994, pp. 373-396
Citations number
65
Categorie Soggetti
Political Science
ISSN journal
10659129
Volume
47
Issue
2
Year of publication
1994
Pages
373 - 396
Database
ISI
SICI code
1065-9129(1994)47:2<373:TTOCAA>2.0.ZU;2-K
Abstract
Burden sharing has been a contentious topic from the early years of th e North Atlantic alliance. Since 1966, it has also been a recurring te st of the theory of collective action. Here we report the results of n ew tests of Mancur Olson's theory and its extension, the joint-product model, proposed by Todd Sandler et al. Our analyses of pooled cross-s ectional and time-series data for fifteen NATO allies, 1950-86, offers the first full, independent test of the joint-product model. While ou r analyses demonstrate the theoretical value of Sandler's model, they also indicate that Olson's original emphasis on the public nature of t he good supplied by the alliance remains valid. Some evidence regardin g the role of the United States suggests that NATO has been a uniquely privileged group.