Citation: Fs. Morton, THE STRATEGIC RESPONSE BY PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS TO THE MEDICAID MOST-FAVORED-CUSTOMER RULES, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 269-290
Citation: Pm. Parker et Lh. Roller, COLLUSIVE CONDUCT IN DUOPOLIES - MULTIMARKET CONTACT AND CROSS-OWNERSHIP IN THE MOBILE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 304-322
Citation: Tr. Lewis et Dem. Sappington, PENALIZING SUCCESS IN DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONTRACTS - NO GOOD DEED GOESUNPUNISHED, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 346-358
Citation: U. Lehmanngrube, STRATEGIC CHOICE OF QUALITY WHEN QUALITY IS COSTLY - THE PERSISTENCE OF THE HIGH-QUALITY ADVANTAGE, The Rand journal of economics, 28(2), 1997, pp. 372-384
Citation: Yk. Che et D. Earnhart, OPTIMAL USE OF INFORMATION IN LITIGATION - SHOULD REGULATORY INFORMATION BE WITHHELD TO DETER FRIVOLOUS SUITS, The Rand journal of economics, 28(1), 1997, pp. 120-134
Citation: O. Ashenfelter et al., CONTRACT-FORM AND PROCUREMENT COSTS - THE IMPACT OF COMPULSORY MULTIPLE CONTRACTOR LAWS IN CONSTRUCTION, The Rand journal of economics, 28, 1997, pp. 5-16
Citation: Tf. Bresnahan et al., MARKET-SEGMENTATION AND THE SOURCES OF RENTS FROM INNOVATION - PERSONAL COMPUTERS IN THE LATE 1980S, The Rand journal of economics, 28, 1997, pp. 17-44
Citation: Ta. Cameron et J. Englin, WELFARE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN ENVIRONMENTAL-QUALITY UNDER INDIVIDUAL UNCERTAINTY ABOUT USE, The Rand journal of economics, 28, 1997, pp. 45-70
Citation: T. Eisenberg et Hs. Farber, THE LITIGIOUS PLAINTIFF HYPOTHESIS - CASE SELECTION AND RESOLUTION, The Rand journal of economics, 28, 1997, pp. 92-112