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Table of contents of journal: *Games and economic behavior (Print)

Results: 1-25/426
SOCIAL-ORGANIZATION AND MECHANISM DESIGN - INTRODUCTION
Authors: DASPREMONT C
Citation: C. Daspremont, SOCIAL-ORGANIZATION AND MECHANISM DESIGN - INTRODUCTION, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(2), 1998, pp. 147-148
REGULATION OF A RISK AVERSE FIRM
Authors: LAFFONT JJ ROCHET JC
Citation: Jj. Laffont et Jc. Rochet, REGULATION OF A RISK AVERSE FIRM, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(2), 1998, pp. 149-173
CONTRACTS AND PRODUCTIVE INFORMATION GATHERING
Authors: CREMER J KHALIL F ROCHET JC
Citation: J. Cremer et al., CONTRACTS AND PRODUCTIVE INFORMATION GATHERING, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(2), 1998, pp. 174-193
EFFICIENT PRIVATE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC-GOODS UNDER COMMON AGENCY
Authors: LAUSSEL D LEBRETON M
Citation: D. Laussel et M. Lebreton, EFFICIENT PRIVATE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC-GOODS UNDER COMMON AGENCY, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(2), 1998, pp. 194-218
A MODEL OF EFFICIENT DISCOVERY
Authors: MNOOKIN R WILSON R
Citation: R. Mnookin et R. Wilson, A MODEL OF EFFICIENT DISCOVERY, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(2), 1998, pp. 219-250
ECONOMIC DYNASTIES WITH INTERMISSIONS
Authors: GEVERS L MICHEL P
Citation: L. Gevers et P. Michel, ECONOMIC DYNASTIES WITH INTERMISSIONS, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(2), 1998, pp. 251-271
STRATEGY-PROOF VOTING ON COMPACT RANGES
Authors: BARBERA S MASSO J SERIZAWA S
Citation: S. Barbera et al., STRATEGY-PROOF VOTING ON COMPACT RANGES, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(2), 1998, pp. 272-291
SELF-FULFILLING MECHANISMS IN BAYESIAN GAMES
Authors: FORGES F MINELLI E
Citation: F. Forges et E. Minelli, SELF-FULFILLING MECHANISMS IN BAYESIAN GAMES, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(2), 1998, pp. 292-310
LINEAR INEQUALITY METHODS TO ENFORCE PARTNERSHIPS UNDER UNCERTAINTY -AN OVERVIEW
Authors: DASPREMONT C GERARDVARET LA
Citation: C. Daspremont et La. Gerardvaret, LINEAR INEQUALITY METHODS TO ENFORCE PARTNERSHIPS UNDER UNCERTAINTY -AN OVERVIEW, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(2), 1998, pp. 311-336
REINTERPRETING ARBITRATIONS NARCOTIC EFFECT - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF LEARNING IN REPEATED BARGAINING
Authors: BOLTON GE KATOK E
Citation: Ge. Bolton et E. Katok, REINTERPRETING ARBITRATIONS NARCOTIC EFFECT - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF LEARNING IN REPEATED BARGAINING, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(1), 1998, pp. 1-33
NONLINEAR BEHAVIOR IN SEALED BID FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS
Authors: CHEN KY PLOTT CR
Citation: Ky. Chen et Cr. Plott, NONLINEAR BEHAVIOR IN SEALED BID FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(1), 1998, pp. 34-78
ON THE NONCONVERGENCE OF FICTITIOUS PLAY IN COORDINATION GAMES
Authors: FOSTER DP YOUNG HP
Citation: Dp. Foster et Hp. Young, ON THE NONCONVERGENCE OF FICTITIOUS PLAY IN COORDINATION GAMES, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(1), 1998, pp. 79-96
COMPARATIVE STATICS IN FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS
Authors: LEBRUN B
Citation: B. Lebrun, COMPARATIVE STATICS IN FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(1), 1998, pp. 97-110
EXTENDED POISSON GAMES AND THE CONDORCET JURY THEOREM
Authors: MYERSON RB
Citation: Rb. Myerson, EXTENDED POISSON GAMES AND THE CONDORCET JURY THEOREM, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(1), 1998, pp. 111-131
ON THE INCENTIVES TO CULTIVATE FAVORED MINORITIES - A NOTE
Authors: UEDA K
Citation: K. Ueda, ON THE INCENTIVES TO CULTIVATE FAVORED MINORITIES - A NOTE, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(1), 1998, pp. 132-143
SOCIAL-LEARNING IN RECURRING GAMES (VOL 21, PG 102, 1997)
Authors: JACKSON MO KALAI E
Citation: Mo. Jackson et E. Kalai, SOCIAL-LEARNING IN RECURRING GAMES (VOL 21, PG 102, 1997), Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(1), 1998, pp. 145-145
SPECIAL ISSUE - AUMANN,ROBERT,J., PART 2
Citation: SPECIAL ISSUE - AUMANN,ROBERT,J., PART 2, Games and economic behavior (Print), 24(1-2), 1998, pp. 1-1
AN INCOMPLETE COOPERATION STRUCTURE FOR A VOTING GAME CAN BE STRATEGICALLY STABLE
Authors: FEINBERG Y
Citation: Y. Feinberg, AN INCOMPLETE COOPERATION STRUCTURE FOR A VOTING GAME CAN BE STRATEGICALLY STABLE, Games and economic behavior (Print), 24(1-2), 1998, pp. 2-9
RECIPROCITY, TRUST, AND PAYOFF PRIVACY IN EXTENSIVE FORM BARGAINING
Authors: MCCABE KA RASSENTI SJ SMITH VL
Citation: Ka. Mccabe et al., RECIPROCITY, TRUST, AND PAYOFF PRIVACY IN EXTENSIVE FORM BARGAINING, Games and economic behavior (Print), 24(1-2), 1998, pp. 10-24
VECTOR MEASURE GAMES BASED ON MEASURES WITH VALUES IN AN INFINITE-DIMENSIONAL VECTOR-SPACE
Authors: MILCHTAICH I
Citation: I. Milchtaich, VECTOR MEASURE GAMES BASED ON MEASURES WITH VALUES IN AN INFINITE-DIMENSIONAL VECTOR-SPACE, Games and economic behavior (Print), 24(1-2), 1998, pp. 25-46
AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION IN NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES
Authors: MORENO D WOODERS J
Citation: D. Moreno et J. Wooders, AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION IN NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES, Games and economic behavior (Print), 24(1-2), 1998, pp. 47-76
THE B-NUCLEOLUS OF TU-GAMES
Authors: REIJNIERSE H POTTERS J
Citation: H. Reijnierse et J. Potters, THE B-NUCLEOLUS OF TU-GAMES, Games and economic behavior (Print), 24(1-2), 1998, pp. 77-96
NAIVE ADAPTIVE-BEHAVIOR AND THE OBSERVABILITY OF GAMBLES
Authors: ROBSON AJ
Citation: Aj. Robson, NAIVE ADAPTIVE-BEHAVIOR AND THE OBSERVABILITY OF GAMBLES, Games and economic behavior (Print), 24(1-2), 1998, pp. 97-108
THE FAMILY OF LEAST-SQUARE VALUES FOR TRANSFERABLE UTILITY GAMES
Authors: RUIZ LM VALENCIANO F ZARZUELO JM
Citation: Lm. Ruiz et al., THE FAMILY OF LEAST-SQUARE VALUES FOR TRANSFERABLE UTILITY GAMES, Games and economic behavior (Print), 24(1-2), 1998, pp. 109-130
ITERATED EXPECTATIONS AND COMMON PRIORS
Authors: SAMET D
Citation: D. Samet, ITERATED EXPECTATIONS AND COMMON PRIORS, Games and economic behavior (Print), 24(1-2), 1998, pp. 131-141
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