EXTENDED POISSON GAMES AND THE CONDORCET JURY THEOREM

Authors
MYERSON RB
Citation
Rb. Myerson, EXTENDED POISSON GAMES AND THE CONDORCET JURY THEOREM, Games and economic behavior (Print), 25(1), 1998, pp. 111-131
Citations number
16
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
Games and economic behavior (Print) → ACNP
ISSN journal
08998256
Volume
25
Issue
1
Year of publication
1998
Pages
111 - 131
Database
ISI
SICI code
0899-8256(1998)25:1<111:EPGATC>2.0.ZU;2-D
Abstract
The Poisson model of games with population uncertainty is extended, by allowing that expected population sizes and players' utility function s may depend on an unknown state of the world. Such extended Poisson g ames are applied to prove a generalization of the Condorcet jury theor em. Classification Numbers: C72, D71. (C) 1998 Academic Press.