Citation: W. Hildenbrand, HOW RELEVANT ARE SPECIFICATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL RELATIONS ON THE MICROLEVEL FOR MODELING THE TIME PATH OF POPULATION AGGREGATES, European economic review, 42(3-5), 1998, pp. 437-458
Citation: Pa. Chiappori et al., MORAL HAZARD AND THE DEMAND FOR PHYSICIAN SERVICES - FIRST LESSONS FROM A FRENCH NATURAL EXPERIMENT, European economic review, 42(3-5), 1998, pp. 499-511
Citation: A. Holly et al., AN ECONOMETRIC-MODEL OF HEALTH-CARE UTILIZATION AND HEALTH-INSURANCE IN SWITZERLAND, European economic review, 42(3-5), 1998, pp. 513-522
Citation: C. Carraro et D. Siniscalco, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS - INCENTIVES AND POLITICAL-ECONOMY, European economic review, 42(3-5), 1998, pp. 561-572
Citation: G. Ecchia et M. Mariotti, COALITION-FORMATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND THEROLE OF INSTITUTIONS, European economic review, 42(3-5), 1998, pp. 573-582
Citation: A. Ulph, POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONS AND THE DESIGN OF ENVIRONMENTAL-POLICY IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, European economic review, 42(3-5), 1998, pp. 583-592
Citation: Tf. Cooley et Gd. Hansen, THE ROLE OF MONETARY SHOCKS IN EQUILIBRIUM BUSINESS-CYCLE THEORY - 3 EXAMPLES, European economic review, 42(3-5), 1998, pp. 605-617
Citation: D. Diermeier et Tj. Feddersen, COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS - COHESION AND DISTRIBUTION IN LEGISLATURES, European economic review, 42(3-5), 1998, pp. 665-672
Citation: Jj. Laffont et D. Martimort, TRANSACTION COSTS, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, European economic review, 42(3-5), 1998, pp. 673-684