Citation: D. Krackhardt, ORGANIZATIONAL VISCOSITY AND THE DIFFUSION OF CONTROVERSIAL INNOVATIONS, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 22(2), 1997, pp. 177-199
Citation: P. Bonacich et Ej. Bienenstock, LATENT CLASSES IN EXCHANGE NETWORKS - SETS OF POSITIONS WITH COMMON INTERESTS, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 22(1), 1997, pp. 1-28
Citation: Gr. Barnes et al., ALGEBRAIC STRUCTURE OF THE INTERACTION SEMIGROUP AS RELATED TO THE HOMOGENEITY OF NETWORK, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 21(4), 1996, pp. 295-323
Citation: J. Angle, HOW THE GAMMA LAW OF INCOME-DISTRIBUTION APPEARS INVARIANT UNDER AGGREGATION, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 21(4), 1996, pp. 325-358
Citation: Jm. Roberts, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CORRESPONDENCE-ANALYSIS OF SOCIOMATRICES, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 21(4), 1996, pp. 359-368
Citation: Chca. Henning, A CRITICAL COMMENT ON BRAUNS RESTRICTED ACCESS IN EXCHANGE SYSTEMS, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 21(4), 1996, pp. 369-377
Citation: J. Weesie et W. Raub, PRIVATE ORDERING - A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF HOSTAGE GAMES, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 21(3), 1996, pp. 201-240
Citation: Me. Vogel, THE NEGOTIATED GUILTY PLEA - VACANCIES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CASELOAD PRESSURE EXPLANATION, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 21(3), 1996, pp. 241-288
Citation: Tj. Fararo, QUANTITATIVE SOCIODYNAMICS - STOCHASTIC METHODS AND MODELS OF SOCIAL-INTERACTION PROCESSES - HELBING,D, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 21(3), 1996, pp. 289-293
Citation: A. Flache et Mw. Macy, THE WEAKNESS OF STRONG TIES - COLLECTIVE ACTION FAILURE IN A HIGHLY COHESIVE GROUP, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 21(1-2), 1996, pp. 3-28
Citation: Eph. Zeggelink et al., THE EMERGENCE OF GROUPS IN THE EVOLUTION OF FRIENDSHIP NETWORKS, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 21(1-2), 1996, pp. 29-55
Citation: J. Skvoretz et al., SOCIAL, STRUCTURE, NETWORKS, AND E-STATE STRUCTURALISM MODELS, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 21(1-2), 1996, pp. 57-76
Citation: Fn. Stokman et Eph. Zeggelink, IS POLITICS POWER OR POLICY ORIENTED - A COMPARATIVE-ANALYSIS OF DYNAMIC ACCESS MODELS IN POLICY NETWORKS, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 21(1-2), 1996, pp. 77-111
Citation: Fn. Stokman et P. Doreian, EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NETWORKS - CONCLUDING REMARKS, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 21(1-2), 1996, pp. 197-199
Citation: Fn. Stokman et Jv. Stokman, STRATEGIC CONTROL AND INTERESTS, ITS EFFECTS ON DECISION OUTCOMES, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 20(4), 1995, pp. 289-317
Citation: F. Nielsen, MERITOCRATIC AND MONOPOLY INEQUALITY - A COMPUTER-SIMULATION OF INCOME-DISTRIBUTION, The Journal of mathematical sociology, 20(4), 1995, pp. 319-350