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Results: 501-525/1132
Authors:
RASMUSSEN DW
Citation: Dw. Rasmussen, CRIME - WILSON,JQ, PETERSILIA,J, Public choice, 93(1-2), 1997, pp. 202-205
Authors:
CHAPPELL HW
Citation: Hw. Chappell, CONGRESS AND THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY - PARKER,GR, Public choice, 93(1-2), 1997, pp. 205-208
Authors:
COWEN T
Citation: T. Cowen, THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF THE MINIMAL STATE - ROWLEY,CK, Public choice, 93(1-2), 1997, pp. 208-210
Authors:
DORUSSEN H
Citation: H. Dorussen, SINGAPORE AUTHORITARIAN CAPITALISM - ASIAN VALUES, FREE-MARKET ILLUSIONS, AND POLITICAL DEPENDENCY - LINGLE,C, Public choice, 93(1-2), 1997, pp. 210-213
Authors:
RAMSEYER JM
Citation: Jm. Ramseyer, THE JAPANESE ELECTION SYSTEM - 3 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES - WADA,J, Public choice, 93(1-2), 1997, pp. 213-215
Authors:
AUSTIN A
Citation: A. Austin, GAME-THEORY AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY - THE SPANISH MODEL - COLOMER,JM, Public choice, 93(1-2), 1997, pp. 216-219
Authors:
ATLAS CM
HENDERSHOTT RJ
ZUPAN MA
Citation: Cm. Atlas et al., OPTIMAL EFFORT ALLOCATION BY US SENATORS - THE ROLE OF CONSTITUENCY SIZE, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 221-229
Authors:
THORBECKE W
Citation: W. Thorbecke, EXPLAINING HOUSE VOTING ON THE NORTH-AMERICAN FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 231-242
Authors:
USLANER EM
Citation: Em. Uslaner, IF YOU CANT PLEASE EVERYONE, MUST YOU ONLY PLEASE YOURSELF - PERSONALOR PARTY IDEOLOGIES AND SENATE ROLL CALL VOTING, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 243-260
Authors:
BRUNER EJ
Citation: Ej. Bruner, AN EMPIRICAL-TEST OF NEUTRALITY AND THE CROWDING-OUT HYPOTHESIS, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 261-279
Authors:
ABIZADEH S
CYRENNE P
Citation: S. Abizadeh et P. Cyrenne, ON DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN LEVIATHAN AND PUBLIC-INTEREST GOVERNMENTS IN A FEDERAL STATE, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 281-299
Authors:
SAVING JL
Citation: Jl. Saving, HUMAN-CAPITAL, COMMITTEE POWER AND LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 301-316
Authors:
DELORME CD
FRAME WS
KAMERSCHEN DR
Citation: Cd. Delorme et al., EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE ON A SPECIAL-INTEREST-GROUP PERSPECTIVE TO ANTITRUST, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 317-335
Authors:
FIELDS JA
KLEIN LS
SFIRIDIS JM
Citation: Ja. Fields et al., A MARKET-BASED EVALUATION OF THE ELECTION VERSUS APPOINTMENT OF REGULATORY COMMISSIONERS, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 337-351
Authors:
LETTERIE W
SWANK OH
Citation: W. Letterie et Oh. Swank, LEARNING AND SIGNALING BY ADVISER SELECTION, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 353-367
Authors:
MCNUTT P
Citation: P. Mcnutt, RENT-SEEKING AND POLITICAL TENURE - FIRST ESTIMATES, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 369-385
Authors:
CARLSEN F
Citation: F. Carlsen, OPINION POLLS AND POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES - THEORY AND EVIDENCE FORTHE UNITED-STATES, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 387-406
Authors:
PRICE S
Citation: S. Price, POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES AND MACROECONOMIC CREDIBILITY - A SURVEY, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 407-427
Authors:
GARTNER M
Citation: M. Gartner, TIME-CONSISTENT MONETARY-POLICY UNDER OUTPUT PERSISTENCE, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 429-437
Authors:
PECORINO P
Citation: P. Pecorino, THE MOSAIC OF ECONOMIC-GROWTH - LANDAU,R, TAYLOR,T, WRIGHT,G, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 439-442
Authors:
MUNGER MC
Citation: Mc. Munger, IMPROPER INFLUENCE - CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW, POLITICAL INTEREST-GROUPS,AND THE PROBLEMS OF EQUALITY - GAIS,T, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 442-446
Authors:
TOMA M
Citation: M. Toma, MONETARY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE GREAT-DEPRESSION - STEINDL,FG, Public choice, 92(3-4), 1997, pp. 446-449
Authors:
LOTT JR
Citation: Jr. Lott, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE - WITTMAN,D, Public choice, 92(1-2), 1997, pp. 1-13
Authors:
ROWLEY CK
Citation: Ck. Rowley, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE - WITTMAN,D, Public choice, 92(1-2), 1997, pp. 15-26
Authors:
ALLEN SD
BRAY J
SEAKS TG
Citation: Sd. Allen et al., A MULTINOMINAL LOGIT ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF POLICY VARIABLES AND BOARD EXPERIENCE ON FOMC VOTING-BEHAVIOR, Public choice, 92(1-2), 1997, pp. 27-39