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Citation: Cj. Weinberger, Selective acceptance and inefficiency in a two-issue complete information bargaining game, GAME ECON B, 31(2), 2000, pp. 262-293
Citation: J. Alcalde et A. Romero-medina, Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems, GAME ECON B, 31(2), 2000, pp. 294-302
Citation: R. Amir et J. Wooders, One-way spillovers, endogenous innovator/imitator roles, and research joint ventures, GAME ECON B, 31(1), 2000, pp. 1-25
Citation: G. Codognato, Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets:A comparison between two models, GAME ECON B, 31(1), 2000, pp. 136-146
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