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Results: 151-175/628
Authors:
Rustichini, A
Citation: A. Rustichini, Optimal properties of stimulus-response learning models, GAME ECON B, 29(1-2), 1999, pp. 244-273
Authors:
Sorin, S
Citation: S. Sorin, Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information, GAME ECON B, 29(1-2), 1999, pp. 274-308
Authors:
Blonski, M
Citation: M. Blonski, Anonymous games with binary actions, GAME ECON B, 28(2), 1999, pp. 171-180
Authors:
Einy, E
Holzman, R
Monderer, D
Citation: E. Einy et al., On the least core and the Mas-Colell bargaining set, GAME ECON B, 28(2), 1999, pp. 181-188
Authors:
Harrington, JE
Citation: Je. Harrington, The equilibrium level of rigidity in a hierarchy, GAME ECON B, 28(2), 1999, pp. 189-202
Authors:
Israeli, E
Citation: E. Israeli, Sowing doubt optimally in two-person repeated games, GAME ECON B, 28(2), 1999, pp. 203-216
Authors:
Kambe, S
Citation: S. Kambe, Bargaining with imperfect commitment, GAME ECON B, 28(2), 1999, pp. 217-237
Authors:
Laskowski, MC
Slonim, RL
Citation: Mc. Laskowski et Rl. Slonim, An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information, GAME ECON B, 28(2), 1999, pp. 238-255
Authors:
Lo, KC
Citation: Kc. Lo, Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players, GAME ECON B, 28(2), 1999, pp. 256-270
Authors:
Saijo, T
Tatamitani, Y
Yamato, T
Citation: T. Saijo et al., Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences, GAME ECON B, 28(2), 1999, pp. 271-293
Authors:
Sarin, R
Vahid, F
Citation: R. Sarin et F. Vahid, Payoff assessments without probabilities: A simple dynamic model of choice, GAME ECON B, 28(2), 1999, pp. 294-309
Authors:
Tomala, T
Citation: T. Tomala, Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors, GAME ECON B, 28(2), 1999, pp. 310-324
Authors:
Biswas, AK
Parthasarathy, T
Potters, JAM
Voorneveld, M
Citation: Ak. Biswas et al., Large cores and exactness, GAME ECON B, 28(1), 1999, pp. 1-12
Authors:
Huck, S
Oechssler, J
Citation: S. Huck et J. Oechssler, The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations, GAME ECON B, 28(1), 1999, pp. 13-24
Authors:
Merlo, A
Schotter, A
Citation: A. Merlo et A. Schotter, A surprise-quiz view of learning in economic experiments, GAME ECON B, 28(1), 1999, pp. 25-54
Authors:
Monderer, D
Tennenholtz, M
Citation: D. Monderer et M. Tennenholtz, Distributed games, GAME ECON B, 28(1), 1999, pp. 55-72
Authors:
Muto, S
Citation: S. Muto, The Banzhaf index in representative systems with multiple political parties, GAME ECON B, 28(1), 1999, pp. 73-104
Authors:
van Damme, E
Hurkens, S
Citation: E. Van Damme et S. Hurkens, Endogenous Stackelberg leadership, GAME ECON B, 28(1), 1999, pp. 105-129
Authors:
van den Elzen, A
Talman, D
Citation: A. Van Den Elzen et D. Talman, An algorithmic approach toward the tracing procedure for bi-matrix games, GAME ECON B, 28(1), 1999, pp. 130-145
Authors:
Voorneveld, M
Vermeulen, D
Borm, P
Citation: M. Voorneveld et al., Axiomatizations of Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games, GAME ECON B, 28(1), 1999, pp. 146-154
Authors:
Rubinstein, A
Citation: A. Rubinstein, Experience from a course in game theory: Pre- and postclass problem sets as a didactic device, GAME ECON B, 28(1), 1999, pp. 155-170
Authors:
Baliga, S
Citation: S. Baliga, Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games, GAME ECON B, 27(2), 1999, pp. 173-183
Authors:
Gilli, M
Citation: M. Gilli, On non-Nash equilibria, GAME ECON B, 27(2), 1999, pp. 184-203
Authors:
Gomes, A
Hart, S
Mas-Colell, A
Citation: A. Gomes et al., Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field, GAME ECON B, 27(2), 1999, pp. 204-228
Authors:
Lazarus, AJ
Loeb, DE
Propp, JG
Stromquist, WR
Ullman, DH
Citation: Aj. Lazarus et al., Combinatorial games under auction play, GAME ECON B, 27(2), 1999, pp. 229-264