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Results: 176-200/628
Authors:
Modica, S
Rustichini, A
Citation: S. Modica et A. Rustichini, Unawareness and partitional information structures, GAME ECON B, 27(2), 1999, pp. 265-298
Authors:
Moulin, H
Shenker, S
Citation: H. Moulin et S. Shenker, Distributive and additive costsharing of an homogeneous good, GAME ECON B, 27(2), 1999, pp. 299-330
Authors:
Suijs, J
Borm, P
Citation: J. Suijs et P. Borm, Stochastic cooperative games: Superadditivity, convexity, and certainty equivalents, GAME ECON B, 27(2), 1999, pp. 331-345
Authors:
Anderlini, L
Citation: L. Anderlini, Communication, computability, and common interest games, GAME ECON B, 27(1), 1999, pp. 1-37
Authors:
Baliga, S
Sjostrom, T
Citation: S. Baliga et T. Sjostrom, Interactive implementation, GAME ECON B, 27(1), 1999, pp. 38-63
Authors:
Choi, J
Kim, T
Citation: J. Choi et T. Kim, A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation, GAME ECON B, 27(1), 1999, pp. 64-85
Authors:
Holt, DJ
Citation: Dj. Holt, An empirical model of strategic choice with an application to coordinationgames, GAME ECON B, 27(1), 1999, pp. 86-105
Authors:
Kultti, K
Citation: K. Kultti, Equivalence of auctions and posted prices, GAME ECON B, 27(1), 1999, pp. 106-113
Authors:
Minehart, D
Scotchmer, S
Citation: D. Minehart et S. Scotchmer, Ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information, GAME ECON B, 27(1), 1999, pp. 114-131
Authors:
Nakanishi, N
Citation: N. Nakanishi, Reexamination of the international export quota game through the theory ofsocial situations, GAME ECON B, 27(1), 1999, pp. 132-152
Authors:
Zhao, JG
Citation: Jg. Zhao, A beta-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets, GAME ECON B, 27(1), 1999, pp. 153-168
Authors:
Bikhchandani, S
Citation: S. Bikhchandani, Auctions of heterogeneous objects, GAME ECON B, 26(2), 1999, pp. 193-220
Authors:
Burnell, SJ
Evans, L
Yao, ST
Citation: Sj. Burnell et al., The ultimatum game: Optimal strategies without fairness, GAME ECON B, 26(2), 1999, pp. 221-252
Authors:
Marx, LM
Citation: Lm. Marx, Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance, GAME ECON B, 26(2), 1999, pp. 253-278
Authors:
Perry, M
Reny, PJ
Citation: M. Perry et Pj. Reny, A general solution to King Solomon's dilemma, GAME ECON B, 26(2), 1999, pp. 279-285
Authors:
Ray, D
Vohra, R
Citation: D. Ray et R. Vohra, A theory of endogenous coalition structures, GAME ECON B, 26(2), 1999, pp. 286-336
Authors:
Sjostrom, T
Citation: T. Sjostrom, Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation, GAME ECON B, 26(2), 1999, pp. 337-352
Authors:
Yi, SS
Citation: Ss. Yi, On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria, GAME ECON B, 26(2), 1999, pp. 353-364
Authors:
Amir, R
Grilo, I
Citation: R. Amir et I. Grilo, Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium, GAME ECON B, 26(1), 1999, pp. 1-21
Authors:
De Fraja, G
Citation: G. De Fraja, After you sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment, GAME ECON B, 26(1), 1999, pp. 22-39
Authors:
Ferreira, JL
Citation: Jl. Ferreira, Endogenous formation of coalitions in noncooperative games, GAME ECON B, 26(1), 1999, pp. 40-58
Authors:
Hamiache, G
Citation: G. Hamiache, A value with incomplete communication, GAME ECON B, 26(1), 1999, pp. 59-78
Authors:
Hopkins, E
Citation: E. Hopkins, Learning, matching, and aggregation, GAME ECON B, 26(1), 1999, pp. 79-110
Authors:
McLennan, A
Park, IU
Citation: A. Mclennan et Iu. Park, Generic 4 x 4 two person games have at most 15 Nash equilibria, GAME ECON B, 26(1), 1999, pp. 111-130
Authors:
Wit, J
Citation: J. Wit, Social learning in a common interest voting game, GAME ECON B, 26(1), 1999, pp. 131-156