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Results: 1-7 |
Results: 7
Evolutionary stability concepts for N-species frequency-dependent interactions
Authors: Cressman, R Garay, J Hofbauer, J
Citation: R. Cressman et al., Evolutionary stability concepts for N-species frequency-dependent interactions, J THEOR BIO, 211(1), 2001, pp. 1-10
Subgame monotonicity in extensive form evolutionary games
Authors: Cressman, R
Citation: R. Cressman, Subgame monotonicity in extensive form evolutionary games, GAME ECON B, 32(2), 2000, pp. 183-205
An example of dynamic (in) consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games
Authors: Chamberland, M Cressman, R
Citation: M. Chamberland et R. Cressman, An example of dynamic (in) consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games, GAME ECON B, 30(2), 2000, pp. 319-326
An ESS maximum principle for matrix games
Authors: Vincent, TL Cressman, R
Citation: Tl. Vincent et R. Cressman, An ESS maximum principle for matrix games, THEOR POP B, 58(3), 2000, pp. 173-186
Nonlinear frequency-dependent selection at a single locus with two allelesand two phenotypes
Authors: Yi, T Cressman, R Brooks, B
Citation: T. Yi et al., Nonlinear frequency-dependent selection at a single locus with two allelesand two phenotypes, J MATH BIOL, 39(4), 1999, pp. 283-308
The dynamic (In) stability of backwards induction
Authors: Cressman, R Schlag, KH
Citation: R. Cressman et Kh. Schlag, The dynamic (In) stability of backwards induction, J ECON THEO, 83(2), 1998, pp. 260-285
On the evolutionary dynamics of crime
Authors: Cressman, R Morrison, WG Wen, JF
Citation: R. Cressman et al., On the evolutionary dynamics of crime, CAN J ECON, 31(5), 1998, pp. 1101-1117
Risultati: 1-7 |