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Results: 1-18 |
Results: 18
COMPARISON OF EXPERTS
Authors: LEHRER E
Citation: E. Lehrer, COMPARISON OF EXPERTS, Journal of mathematical economics, 30(2), 1998, pp. 207-214
LITHIUM, HYPERCALCEMIA, AND ARRHYTHMIA
Authors: WOLF ME MOFFAT M RANADE V SOMBERG JC LEHRER E MOSNAIM AD
Citation: Me. Wolf et al., LITHIUM, HYPERCALCEMIA, AND ARRHYTHMIA, Journal of clinical psychopharmacology, 18(5), 1998, pp. 420-423
EPSILON-CONSISTENT EQUILIBRIUM IN REPEATED GAMES
Authors: LEHRER E SORIN S
Citation: E. Lehrer et S. Sorin, EPSILON-CONSISTENT EQUILIBRIUM IN REPEATED GAMES, International journal of game theory, 27(2), 1998, pp. 231-244
ONE-SHOT PUBLIC MEDIATED TALK
Authors: LEHRER E SORIN S
Citation: E. Lehrer et S. Sorin, ONE-SHOT PUBLIC MEDIATED TALK, Games and economic behavior, 20(2), 1997, pp. 131-148
REPEATED LARGE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Authors: LEHRER E SMORODINSKY R
Citation: E. Lehrer et R. Smorodinsky, REPEATED LARGE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, Games and economic behavior, 18(1), 1997, pp. 116-134
AEROSOL CHEMICAL-COMPOSITION DURING TROPOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AT NY ALESUND SVALBARD/
Authors: LEHRER E WAGENBACH D PLATT U
Citation: E. Lehrer et al., AEROSOL CHEMICAL-COMPOSITION DURING TROPOSPHERIC OZONE DEPLETION AT NY ALESUND SVALBARD/, Tellus. Series B, Chemical and physical meteorology, 49(5), 1997, pp. 486-495
COMPATIBLE MEASURES AND MERGING
Authors: LEHRER E SMORODINSKY R
Citation: E. Lehrer et R. Smorodinsky, COMPATIBLE MEASURES AND MERGING, Mathematics of operations research, 21(3), 1996, pp. 697-706
MEDIATED TALK
Authors: LEHRER E
Citation: E. Lehrer, MEDIATED TALK, International journal of game theory, 25(2), 1996, pp. 177-188
SUBJECTIVE GAMES AND EQUILIBRIA
Authors: KALAI E LEHRER E
Citation: E. Kalai et E. Lehrer, SUBJECTIVE GAMES AND EQUILIBRIA, Games and economic behavior, 8(1), 1995, pp. 123-163
FINITELY MANY PLAYERS WITH BOUNDED RECALL IN INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES
Authors: LEHRER E
Citation: E. Lehrer, FINITELY MANY PLAYERS WITH BOUNDED RECALL IN INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES, Games and economic behavior, 7(3), 1994, pp. 390-405
FINITELY MANY PLAYERS WITH BOUNDED RECALL IN INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES
Authors: LEHRER E
Citation: E. Lehrer, FINITELY MANY PLAYERS WITH BOUNDED RECALL IN INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES, Games and economic behavior, 7(3), 1994, pp. 390-405
LOW DISCOUNTING AND THE UPPER LONG-RUN AVERAGE VALUE IN DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING
Authors: LEHRER E MONDERER D
Citation: E. Lehrer et D. Monderer, LOW DISCOUNTING AND THE UPPER LONG-RUN AVERAGE VALUE IN DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING, Games and economic behavior, 6(2), 1994, pp. 262-282
DISCOUNTING VERSUS AVERAGING IN DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING
Authors: LEHRER E MONDERER D
Citation: E. Lehrer et D. Monderer, DISCOUNTING VERSUS AVERAGING IN DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING, Games and economic behavior, 6(1), 1994, pp. 97-113
WEAK AND STRONG MERGING OF OPINIONS
Authors: KALAI E LEHRER E
Citation: E. Kalai et E. Lehrer, WEAK AND STRONG MERGING OF OPINIONS, Journal of mathematical economics, 23(1), 1994, pp. 73-86
RANDOMIZED TRIAL OF MODIFIED BASSINI VERSUS SHOULDICE INGUINAL-HERNIAREPAIR
Authors: PAUL A TROIDL H WILLIAMS JI RIXEN D LANGEN R VESTWEBER KH MENNIGEN R EYPASCH E BONNINGHOFF N KOHLER L SPANGENBERGER W LEFERING R LEHRER E
Citation: A. Paul et al., RANDOMIZED TRIAL OF MODIFIED BASSINI VERSUS SHOULDICE INGUINAL-HERNIAREPAIR, British Journal of Surgery, 81(10), 1994, pp. 1531-1534
BOUNDED VARIATION OF (V(N)) AND ITS LIMIT
Authors: LEHRER E
Citation: E. Lehrer, BOUNDED VARIATION OF (V(N)) AND ITS LIMIT, International journal of game theory, 22(1), 1993, pp. 31-42
RATIONAL LEARNING LEADS TO NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Authors: KALAI E LEHRER E
Citation: E. Kalai et E. Lehrer, RATIONAL LEARNING LEADS TO NASH EQUILIBRIUM, Econometrica, 61(5), 1993, pp. 1019-1045
SUBJECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN REPEATED GAMES
Authors: KALAI E LEHRER E
Citation: E. Kalai et E. Lehrer, SUBJECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN REPEATED GAMES, Econometrica, 61(5), 1993, pp. 1231-1240
Risultati: 1-18 |