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Results:
1-9
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Results: 9
Authors:
Lepelley, D
Merlin, V
Citation: D. Lepelley et V. Merlin, Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates, ECON THEORY, 17(1), 2001, pp. 53-80
Authors:
Gehrlein, WV
Lepelley, D
Citation: Wv. Gehrlein et D. Lepelley, The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters, MATH SOC SC, 41(1), 2001, pp. 39-50
Authors:
Lepelley, D
Vidu, L
Citation: D. Lepelley et L. Vidu, Iterative positional rules, majority principle and unimodal preferences, RAIRO RE OP, 34(3), 2000, pp. 347-362
Authors:
Lepelley, D
Gehrlein, WV
Citation: D. Lepelley et Wv. Gehrlein, Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules, ECON LETT, 68(2), 2000, pp. 157-164
Authors:
Gehrlein, WV
Lepelley, D
Citation: Wv. Gehrlein et D. Lepelley, The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner, ECON LETT, 66(2), 2000, pp. 191-197
Authors:
Lepelley, D
Pierron, P
Valognes, F
Citation: D. Lepelley et al., Scoring rules, condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity, THEOR DECIS, 49(2), 2000, pp. 175-196
Authors:
Lepelley, D
Valognes, F
Citation: D. Lepelley et F. Valognes, On the Kim and Roush voting procedure, GR DECIS N, 8(2), 1999, pp. 109-123
Authors:
Gehrlein, WV
Lepelley, D
Citation: Wv. Gehrlein et D. Lepelley, Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition, SOC CHOICE, 16(3), 1999, pp. 471-490
Authors:
Lepelley, D
Gehrlein, WV
Citation: D. Lepelley et Wv. Gehrlein, A note on the probability of having a strong Condorcet winner, QUAL QUANT, 33(1), 1999, pp. 85-96
Risultati:
1-9
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