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Results: 1-17 |
Results: 17
LABOR MIGRATION AND REDISTRIBUTION WITH ALTERNATIVE ASSIMILATION POLICIES - THE SMALL ECONOMY CASE
Authors: MICHEL P PESTIEAU P VIDAL JP
Citation: P. Michel et al., LABOR MIGRATION AND REDISTRIBUTION WITH ALTERNATIVE ASSIMILATION POLICIES - THE SMALL ECONOMY CASE, Regional science and urban economics, 28(3), 1998, pp. 363-377
TAX COMPETITION AND REVELATION OF PREFERENCES FOR PUBLIC-EXPENDITURE
Authors: BUCOVETSKY S MARCHAND M PESTIEAU P
Citation: S. Bucovetsky et al., TAX COMPETITION AND REVELATION OF PREFERENCES FOR PUBLIC-EXPENDITURE, Journal of urban economics (Print), 44(3), 1998, pp. 367-390
SOCIAL INSURANCE, MAJORITY VOTING AND LABOR MOBILITY
Authors: CREMER H PESTIEAU P
Citation: H. Cremer et P. Pestieau, SOCIAL INSURANCE, MAJORITY VOTING AND LABOR MOBILITY, Journal of public economics, 68(3), 1998, pp. 397-420
THE VALUE OF EXPLICIT RANDOMIZATION IN THE TAX CODE
Authors: PESTIEAU P POSSEN UM SLUTSKY SM
Citation: P. Pestieau et al., THE VALUE OF EXPLICIT RANDOMIZATION IN THE TAX CODE, Journal of public economics, 67(1), 1998, pp. 87-103
DELAYING INTER VIVOS TRANSMISSIONS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Authors: CREMER H PESTIEAU P
Citation: H. Cremer et P. Pestieau, DELAYING INTER VIVOS TRANSMISSIONS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, Southern economic journal, 65(2), 1998, pp. 322-330
FISCAL-POLICY IN A GROWTH-MODEL WITH BOTH ALTRUISTIC AND NONALTRUISTIC AGENTS
Authors: MICHEL P PESTIEAU P
Citation: P. Michel et P. Pestieau, FISCAL-POLICY IN A GROWTH-MODEL WITH BOTH ALTRUISTIC AND NONALTRUISTIC AGENTS, Southern economic journal, 64(3), 1998, pp. 682-697
VOLUNTEER WORK AND CLUB SIZE - NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND OPTIMALITY
Authors: BARHAM V BOADWAY R MARCHAND M PESTIEAU P
Citation: V. Barham et al., VOLUNTEER WORK AND CLUB SIZE - NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND OPTIMALITY, Journal of public economics, 65(1), 1997, pp. 9-22
INVESTMENT IN LOCAL PUBLIC-SERVICES - NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND SOCIAL OPTIMUM
Authors: CREMER H MARCHAND M PESTIEAU P
Citation: H. Cremer et al., INVESTMENT IN LOCAL PUBLIC-SERVICES - NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND SOCIAL OPTIMUM, Journal of public economics, 65(1), 1997, pp. 23-35
BEQUESTS AS A HEIR DISCIPLINE DEVICE
Authors: CREMER H PESTIEAU P
Citation: H. Cremer et P. Pestieau, BEQUESTS AS A HEIR DISCIPLINE DEVICE, Journal of population economics, 9(4), 1996, pp. 405-414
DISTRIBUTIVE IMPLICATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Authors: CREMER H PESTIEAU P
Citation: H. Cremer et P. Pestieau, DISTRIBUTIVE IMPLICATIONS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, European economic review, 40(3-5), 1996, pp. 747-757
DECOMPOSING EFFICIENCY INTO ITS MANAGERIAL AND ITS REGULATORY COMPONENTS - THE CASE OF EUROPEAN RAILWAYS
Authors: GATHON HJ PESTIEAU P
Citation: Hj. Gathon et P. Pestieau, DECOMPOSING EFFICIENCY INTO ITS MANAGERIAL AND ITS REGULATORY COMPONENTS - THE CASE OF EUROPEAN RAILWAYS, European journal of operational research, 80(3), 1995, pp. 500-507
EDUCATION AND THE POVERTY TRAP
Authors: BARHAM V BOADWAY R MARCHAND M PESTIEAU P
Citation: V. Barham et al., EDUCATION AND THE POVERTY TRAP, European economic review, 39(7), 1995, pp. 1257-1275
SOCIAL PROTECTION AND PRIVATE INSURANCE - REASSESSING THE ROLE OF PUBLIC-SECTOR VERSUS PRIVATE-SECTOR IN INSURANCE - THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE GENEVA ASSOCIATION
Authors: PESTIEAU P
Citation: P. Pestieau, SOCIAL PROTECTION AND PRIVATE INSURANCE - REASSESSING THE ROLE OF PUBLIC-SECTOR VERSUS PRIVATE-SECTOR IN INSURANCE - THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE GENEVA ASSOCIATION, Geneva papers on risk and insurance. Theory, 19(2), 1994, pp. 81-92
TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE DIRECT INDIRECT TAX MIX
Authors: BOADWAY R MARCHAND M PESTIEAU P
Citation: R. Boadway et al., TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE DIRECT INDIRECT TAX MIX, Journal of public economics, 55(1), 1994, pp. 71-88
POPULATION-GROWTH AND OPTIMALITY - WHEN DOES SERENDIPITY HOLD
Authors: MICHEL P PESTIEAU P
Citation: P. Michel et P. Pestieau, POPULATION-GROWTH AND OPTIMALITY - WHEN DOES SERENDIPITY HOLD, Journal of population economics, 6(4), 1993, pp. 353-362
SAVINGS BEHAVIOR IN 17 OECD COUNTRIES
Authors: KESSLER D PERELMAN S PESTIEAU P
Citation: D. Kessler et al., SAVINGS BEHAVIOR IN 17 OECD COUNTRIES, The Review of income and wealth, (1), 1993, pp. 37-49
EDUCATION FOR ATTENTION - A NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION TO THE BEQUEST-AS-EXCHANGE MODEL
Authors: CREMER H PESTIEAU P
Citation: H. Cremer et P. Pestieau, EDUCATION FOR ATTENTION - A NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION TO THE BEQUEST-AS-EXCHANGE MODEL, Public finance, 48, 1993, pp. 85-97
Risultati: 1-17 |