DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS AND SLUGGISH SOCIAL-MOVEMENTS

This Comment argues that civil rights activists have focused too many resources on attempting to gain favorable statutory interpretations in court rather than pursuing changes in Congress. Though in some circum stances a judicial strategy may lead to greater short-run gains, it is less likely to change preferences in the long run. The Comment makes this argument using a modified version of William Eskridge's game-theo retic model of the interaction between the Court, Congress, and the Pr esident. It also adds a second period to the game, with a legislative strategy more likely to shift preferences leftward in the second perio d, The Comment applies the theory to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, arg uing that the 1989 Supreme Court decisions which provoked the Act may have helped civil rights activists by prodding them to return to activ ism focused on Congress, It concludes by suggesting that, in the prese nt environment, a mass action strategy focused on changing long-run pr eferences rather than immediately changing the law either in the court s or in Congress might be most effective.