OFSTED, CRITERIA AND THE NATURE OF SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING - A WITTGENSTEINIAN CRITIQUE OF THE PRACTICE OF EDUCATIONAL JUDGMENT

Since their inception in 1993 OFSTED inspections have generated consid erable controversy amongst teachers and educationists generally. Much of the criticism to date has centred on the effects which such inspect ions have had on schools and their staffs. In contrast little sustaine d concern has been shown about the underlying assumptions of the OFSTE D inspection process. This article identifies as the central feature o f that process a particular but tacit conception of judgement. This co nception is examined from an essentially Wittgensteinian perspective a nd is shown to rely on an imprecise understanding of the nature of cri teria. It is argued that the OFSTED approach implicitly represents wha t are infact conventional criteria, having no guarantee of broad agree ment, as if they were criteria having such agreement, As a result seve re doubts are raised about the validity of the judgements made and hen ce of the inspection process generally.