STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE - HELPING LEGAL DECISION-MAKERS BREAK THE PREJUDICE HABIT

Courts are reluctant to allow attorneys to bring the issue of prejudic e into the open at trial. Judges have barred attorneys who represent s ocially marginalized clients from pointing out that their client comes from a stereotyped group on the grounds that such references ''play t o the prejudices of the jury.'' Although many legal commentators stres s the need to reduce bias in legal proceedings, few commentators have considered whether the colorblind formalism advocated by courts actual ly helps legal decision makers avoid discrimination. This Article argu es that colorblind formalism is counterproductive in reducing discrimi nation, and it develops an empirically grounded framework for combatin g unconscious discrimination. After demonstrating the shortcomings of the ''unconscious racism'' model that has been the focus of much debat e among legal commentators, the author draws on recent research in soc ial and cognitive psychology to distinguish between stereotypes and pr ejudice. The Article defines stereotypes as well-learned internal asso ciations about social groups that are governed by automatic cognitive processes. In contrast, prejudice consists of a set of conscious perso nal beliefs. The author suggests that automatic negative responses to stereotyped groups can be controlled by activating controlled cognitiv e processes. Thus, through careful attention and conscious effort, a n on-prejudiced person can suppress an ingrained stereotype. As a result , the author concludes that references in court that challenge jurors to reexamine and resist their automatic discriminatory tendencies may actually enhance, rather than impede, the rationality and fairness of legal proceedings.