EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION AND CONSISTENCY

Authors
NORDE H POTTERS J REIJNIERSE H VERMEULEN D
Citation
H. Norde et al., EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION AND CONSISTENCY, Games and economic behavior, 12(2), 1996, pp. 219-225
Citations number
15
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
Games and economic behavior → ACNP
ISSN journal
08998256
Volume
12
Issue
2
Year of publication
1996
Pages
219 - 225
Database
ISI
SICI code
0899-8256(1996)12:2<219:ESAC>2.0.ZU;2-Y
Abstract
In this paper we show that, for two important classes of strategic gam es, namely the class of mixed extensions of finite games and the class of games with compact and convex strategy spaces and continuous-conca ve payoff functions, equilibrium selection is incompatible with One Pe rson Rationality, Consistency and (restricted) Non-Emptiness. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.