MORAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY - A CRITIQUE OF ITS KANTIAN PRESUPPOSITIONS

Contemporary moral development theory follows pathways laid down in th e moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). For Kant, moral actio n consists of dutiful adherence to formal rules and has nothing to do with the pursuit of personal goals. Indeed, one can be sure that one's action is moral only if it is done out of duty and goes against all o f one's ''inclinations.'' Some contemporary moral developmentalists (f or instance, Kohlberg and Turiel) are formalists: they draw from Kant the conception of moral rules as universalizable categorical imperativ es, recognizable by their formal features, that pertain to social issu es. Others (e.g., Eisenberg) are altruists: they draw on Kant's insist ence that moral action is inherently self-sacrificial, though they als o insist that moral acts be specifically motivated by the desire to be nefit others. We subject both formalism and altruism to thorough criti que. Both positions define the moral domain too narrowly, leaving out questions of private morality like being honest with oneself; they can not accommodate other principled conceptions of morality, like eudaimo nism, that reject their Kantian presuppositions; and they cannot answe r the question ''Why be moral?'' Whether impersonal or anti-personal, they neglect the personal. We propose a character-based redefinition o f the moral domain that reintegrates moral development with the develo pment of the self and of values, taking advantage of the insights into these areas of development afforded by the interactivist framework. W e conclude by describing the challenges that a truly adequate account of moral development will have to meet and the contributions that euda imonism can make to meeting those challenges. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.