BEYOND FORMALISM AND ALTRUISM - THE PROSPECTS FOR MORAL PERSONALITY

Previously, we argued that moral development research has for too long been reliant on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The Kantian le gacy forces improper restrictions on the moral domain, fails to acknow ledge mature but non-Kantian moral conceptions such as eudaimonism, an d isolates moral development from the development of the self. Now we respond to critical commentary from advocates of post-Kantian formalis m (Helwig, Turiel, & Nucci, 1996) and post-Kantian altruism (Eisenberg , 1996), Helwig et al. deny the validity of eudaimonism as a moral per spective while asserting that it has been incorporated wholesale into a post-Kantian moral synthesis, We refute each of the arguments they p resent. Even if their objections to eudaimonism are completely correct , they have still not explained how anyone might develop a eudaimonist ic moral conception. Eisenberg questions our definitions of altruistic and prosocial behavior; we defend them on their own terms, while show ing how they are largely in accord with Eisenberg's own practice, and that of other ''prosocial development'' researchers, We conclude that moral personality is a legitimate object of study (despite efforts by Helwig et al. to push it out of the scientific arena) and discuss the challenges posed by taking moral personality seriously. (C) 1996 Acade mic Press, Inc.