V. Wass, WHO CONTROLS SELECTION UNDER VOLUNTARY REDUNDANCY - THE CASE OF THE REDUNDANT MINEWORKERS PAYMENTS SCHEME, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 34(2), 1996, pp. 249-265
Voluntary redundancy schemes which offer extra-statutory redundancy pa
yments are often used as a mechanism for implementing redundancy in Br
itain. This paper reports the impact of one such scheme, the Redundant
Mineworkers Payments Scheme of 1984, on the scale of and selection fo
r redundancy in the coal industry. Formal agreements, and ultimately s
tatutory obligations, which restrict managerial control over scale and
selection ill redundancy were bypassed by compensation offers made in
formally to individuals. It is demonstrated that, even under a scheme
based entirely upon self-selection, the employer, through control over
the structure of compensation, retains control over selection. The sc
ale and selection effects facilitated by voluntary redundancy schemes
have important implications for equity in the workplace and efficiency
in the external labour market.