THE NEXT ROUND - GAME-THEORY AND PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVES

The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations proved to be undu ly lengthy because of the absence of an adequate negotiating framework to resolve complex new issues. Although solutions have been found for many issues with the conclusion of the Round, others remain to be add ressed, and emerging issue will require resolution. With a new Round s cheduled to start relatively soon, it is useful to identify a negotiat ing framework that may hasten future discussions. Game theory and publ ic choice are used as analytical tools to illustrate various scenarios that may help policy makers and negotiators identify, with particular reference to agriculture, the likely main issues, bargaining position s and possibilities for compromise. The complexity of the issues, the divergence of positions between countries, the absence of a dominant l eader in world trade, and the emergence of trade and negotiating blocs which lack a unified position are, however, factors that may make the next round of multilateral trade negotiations as protracted as the Ur uguay Round. Discussion and research concerning the issues are require d to facilitate the negotiation process. Copyright (C) 1996 Elsevier S cience Ltd