CONVEX GAMES AND STABLE SETS

It is well known that the core of a convex coalitional game with a fin ite set of players is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set of the game. we extend the definition of a stable set to coalitional gam es with an infinite set of players and give an example of a convex sim ple game with a countable set of players which does not have a stable set. But if a convex game with a countable set of players is continuou s at the grand coalition, we prove that its core is the unique von Neu mann-Morgenstern stable set. we also show that a game with a countable (possibly finite) set of players which is inner continuous is convex iff the core of each of its subgames is a stable set Journal of Econom ic Literature Classification Numbers: C70. C71. (C) 1996 Academic Pres s. Inc.