THE EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION AND COMMITMENT IN A PUBLIC-GOODS SOCIAL DILEMMA

A social dilemma is a situation in which members of a group are faced with a conflict between maximizing personal interests and maximizing c ollective interests. Communication among the members of a group has be en shown to enhance cooperation (maximize groups interests); it was hy pothesized that if members are allowed to make a pledge prior to their actual decision, they can communicate their intentions and hence incr ease the cooperation rate. Two experiments were conducted in which sev eral types of pledge conditions were contrasted with a ''no-pledge'' ( control) condition. As hypothesized, the results indicate that a pledg e enhanced cooperation. However, the degree of commitment required in the pledge differentially affected the cooperation rate. The results a re interpreted in terms of a two-stage dilemma in which members can co ordinate their expectations only if some degree of commitment is requi red in their pledge. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.