The authors develop a model of NLRB decision-making that, unlike the m
odels employed in previous studies, distinguishes between decision-mak
ing in more important, complex cases and less important, simpler cases
. Using a representative sample of Board decisions over 1957-86, they
find that in deciding the minority (20%) of disputes that were particu
larly important or complex, Board members were influenced by their per
sonal preferences and those of Presidents who appointed them-a finding
consistent with the results of previous studies. In the remaining cas
es (about 80%), however, Board members were influenced in their decisi
ons by little more than the recommendations of regional offices and ad
ministrative law judges. Another finding that substantially modifies t
he conclusions of earlier studies is that Board members appear to have
been highly influenced by their accountability to the public when dec
iding more important, complex cases.