This paper offers the generalization that competitive promotions are m
ixed strategies. First an empirical regularity is established that pro
motions are independent across competitors. This regularity is then el
aborated on in the context of a promotion game. The promotion game is
linked to observable outcomes, and a classification of possible situat
ions is developed. In particular, the classification includes the pris
oners' dilemma, battle of the sexes, and marketing models of promotion
competition. The evidence for the generalization comes from a variety
of product markets, spanning trade promotions, retail price reduction
s, and retail promotions such as advertised specials. The product mark
ets include coffee, baby diapers, toilet tissue, saltines, dishwashing
fluid, ketchup, and detergents, among others. The data in some cases
were from cooperating grocery chains and in others from IRI scanner pa
nels. The evidence from extant research and from new analyses is prese
nted. Each situation is identified as belonging to one or another elem
ent of the classification. Based on the entirety of the evidence, ther
e is strong support for the proposition that competitive promotions ar
e mixed strategies. A second generalization, based on more limited dat
a, is that the depth of promotion has a bimodal distribution. Implicat
ions of the generalizations both for managerial practice and future re
search are discussed.