THE ROLE OF ASSET SPECIFICITY IN THE VERTICAL INTEGRATION DECISION

Authors
Citation
G. Whyte, THE ROLE OF ASSET SPECIFICITY IN THE VERTICAL INTEGRATION DECISION, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 23(3), 1994, pp. 287-302
Citations number
46
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
ISSN journal
01672681
Volume
23
Issue
3
Year of publication
1994
Pages
287 - 302
Database
ISI
SICI code
0167-2681(1994)23:3<287:TROASI>2.0.ZU;2-S
Abstract
According to the logic of transaction cost economics, several factors determine the most efficient form of economic organization. These fact ors include uncertainty and frequency of transactions involving the tr ansfer of goods or services, although the most important factor is ass et specificity. These characteristics of transactions engender high tr ansaction costs, but they also parallel the conditions under which the sunk cost effect is most likely to be observed. The potential influen ce of sunk cost considerations in the choice of corporate governance s tructure is illustrated with respect to vertical integration, and was tested in a laboratory study in which subjects were asked to play the role of a firm's chief strategist. The results support the view that a sset specificity drives vertical integration, but for reasons that may have little to do with transaction cost economizing.