COORDINATION AND CONTROL IN A GOVERNMENT AGENCY - CONTINGENCY AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY PERSPECTIVES ON GAO AUDITS

Drawing on both contingency and institutional theories, this paper exa mines how professionals in an institutionalized environment are coordi nated and controlled and what forces shape the structures organization s adopt for this coordination and control. According to contingency th eory, the coordination and control of organizational members is shaped by the task environment and the technical nature of the work they per form, while institutional theory proposes that an organization's need to demonstrate conformity to institutionalized expectations of rationa l practice also influences its choice of control and coordination mech anisms. We use both theoretical perspectives to develop hypotheses tha t are tested with data from a study of 96 audit teams in the United St ates General Accounting Office (GAO). Results show that the more insti tutionalized the environment, (a) the more the organization relies on a bureaucratic mode of control, (b) the greater the task difficulty an d team interdependence and the more the organization relies on persona l and group modes of control, and (c) the more the organization relies on personal and group modes of control to improve audit-team performa nce.