INDEXING INVENTORS - THE SOURCES OF INVENTION REVISITED

This paper presents a behavioral model of an inventor's contractual ch oice in which (a) newly established organized research is formulated t o be an endogenous outcome of this choice, and (b) the value of the in ventor's inventive ingenuity or ability is conceptually defined. We hy pothesize that the difficulty of appropriating the returns to basic kn owledge is a reason why inventors form research organizations. The mai n implication of the model is that inventors with a higher inventive a bility have a greater incentive to organize research. The career paten t records of sixty-three poineering inventors, profiled in Jewkes, Saw ers and Stillerman's Sources of Invention, are examined. The data is c onsistent with the implication of our model: We find that inventors wi th a high index of inventive ability are more likely to be affiliated with organized research.