STRATEGIC TIMING IN GROUP NEGOTIATIONS - THE IMPLICATIONS OF FORCED ENTRY AND FORCED EXIT FOR NEGOTIATORS WITH UNEQUAL POWER

This study used a three-person mixed-motive negotiation to (1) investi gate the effects of asymmetrical caucusing (i.e., negotiations in whic h parties possess unequal opportunities to engage in discussion) on gr oup negotiations and (2) assess potential explanations for these effec ts. Negotiators who were excluded from part of the discussion received a smaller share of rewards than those who remained throughout the dis cussion, and those who were excluded from the latter half of the discu ssion received a smaller share of rewards than those who were excluded from the beginning. In addition, groups that excluded the low power n egotiator from part of the discussion achieved less integrative agreem ents than groups that excluded the high power negotiator and groups th at retained all negotiators throughout the discussion. The results hig hlight the importance of negotiator participation for gaining a share of rewards and the critical role played by negotiators with low power for determining the quality of agreements reached. (C) 1997 Academic P ress.