TIE-BREAKING IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION

Authors
TRANAES T
Citation
T. Tranaes, TIE-BREAKING IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION, Games and economic behavior, 22(1), 1998, pp. 148-161
Citations number
13
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
Games and economic behavior → ACNP
ISSN journal
08998256
Volume
22
Issue
1
Year of publication
1998
Pages
148 - 161
Database
ISI
SICI code
0899-8256(1998)22:1<148:TIGOPI>2.0.ZU;2-O
Abstract
The paper suggests that ties in an extensive form game have strategic implications if they represent credible threats or promises. We consid er a subset of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria obtained by breaking ti es according to their strategic implications, and show that the subset is nonempty for finite extensive form games of perfect information. ( C) 1998 Academic Press.