ENVIRONMENTAL-PROTECTION, AGENCY MOTIVATIONS, AND RENT EXTRACTION - THE REGULATION OF WATER-POLLUTION IN LOUISIANA

Direct environmental regulation has been in place in the United States for more than twenty-five years. Yet there has been little study of w hat actually affects regulatory enforcement levels. This study examine s enforcement issues by focusing on water quality enforcement by the L ouisiana Department of Environmental Quality. The study finds that pen alties are more likely to occur, and are likely to be higher, the more serious a firm's violation of a regulation. Penalties are also more l ikely, and likely to be higher, if a firm has a previous record of env ironmental violations. In contrast to other studies, however, we do no t find that enforcement varies across regional offices. In addition, w e did not find any systematic effects of the Weingast and Moran (1983) theory of legislative dominance. We did, however, find evidence of re nt extraction, along the lines of McChesney (1987; 1991).