Citation: Tr. Roycroft, A DYNAMIC-MODEL OF INCUMBENT LEC RESPONSE TO ENTRY UNDER THE TERMS OFTHE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(3), 1998, pp. 211-227
Citation: Iwh. Parry, POLLUTION REGULATION AND THE EFFICIENCY GAINS FROM TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(3), 1998, pp. 229-254
Citation: N. Oljaca et al., PENALTY-FUNCTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS - EVIDENCE FROM WATER-QUALITY ENFORCEMENT, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(3), 1998, pp. 255-264
Citation: A. Erenrich et Re. Caves, COMPETITION IN PAYPHONES - STATE REGULATIONS AND INDEPENDENT PROVIDERS SHARES, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(3), 1998, pp. 265-279
Citation: Aj. Cox et J. Portes, MERGERS IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES - THE USES AND ABUSES OF EVENT STUDIES, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(3), 1998, pp. 281-304
Citation: Ma. Crew et Pr. Kleindorfer, EFFICIENT ENTRY, MONOPOLY, AND THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATION IN POSTAL SERVICE, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(2), 1998, pp. 103-125
Citation: Kk. Lear et Jw. Maxwell, THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND PENALTY POLICIES ON INCENTIVES FOR COMPLIANCE AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(2), 1998, pp. 127-148
Citation: Am. Marino, REGULATION OF PERFORMANCE STANDARDS VERSUS EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATION WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(1), 1998, pp. 5-18
Citation: An. Kleit, DID OPEN ACCESS INTEGRATE NATURAL-GAS MARKETS - AN ARBITRAGE COST APPROACH, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(1), 1998, pp. 19-33
Citation: L. Blank et al., DOMINANT FIRM PRICING WITH COMPETITIVE ENTRY AND REGULATION - THE CASE OF INTRALATA TOLL, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(1), 1998, pp. 35-53
Citation: Tn. Cason et L. Gangadharan, AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARD TRADING FOR EMISSION PERMITS, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(1), 1998, pp. 55-73
Citation: D. Reiffen, A REGULATED FIRMS INCENTIVE TO DISCRIMINATE - A REEVALUATION AND EXTENSION OF WEISMANS RESULT, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(1), 1998, pp. 79-86
Citation: Dl. Weisman, THE INCENTIVE TO DISCRIMINATE BY A VERTICALLY-INTEGRATED REGULATED FIRM - A REPLY, Journal of regulatory economics, 14(1), 1998, pp. 87-91
Citation: Aw. Dnes et al., THE REGULATION OF THE UNITED-KINGDOM ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY - AN EVENT STUDY OF PRICE-CAPPING MEASURES, Journal of regulatory economics, 13(3), 1998, pp. 207-225
Citation: Ah. Barnett et Dl. Kaserman, THE SIMPLE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND THE UNEASY CASE FOR SUBSCRIBERSHIP SUBSIDIES, Journal of regulatory economics, 13(3), 1998, pp. 245-254
Citation: Al. Kolbe et Ls. Borucki, THE IMPACT OF STRANDED-COST RISK ON REQUIRED RATES OF RETURN FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES - THEORY AND AN EXAMPLE, Journal of regulatory economics, 13(3), 1998, pp. 255-275
Citation: P. Lanoie et al., FIRMS RESPONSES TO EFFLUENT REGULATIONS - PULP AND PAPER IN ONTARIO, 1985-1989, Journal of regulatory economics, 13(2), 1998, pp. 103-120
Citation: An. Kleit et al., ENVIRONMENTAL-PROTECTION, AGENCY MOTIVATIONS, AND RENT EXTRACTION - THE REGULATION OF WATER-POLLUTION IN LOUISIANA, Journal of regulatory economics, 13(2), 1998, pp. 121-137