HOW MUCH DOES THE CEO MATTER - THE ROLE OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION IN THE SETTING OF CEO COMPENSATION

Citation
S. Finkelstein et Bk. Boyd, HOW MUCH DOES THE CEO MATTER - THE ROLE OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION IN THE SETTING OF CEO COMPENSATION, Academy of Management journal, 41(2), 1998, pp. 179-199
Citations number
124
Categorie Soggetti
Management,Business
ISSN journal
00014273
Volume
41
Issue
2
Year of publication
1998
Pages
179 - 199
Database
ISI
SICI code
0001-4273(1998)41:2<179:HMDTCM>2.0.ZU;2-Q
Abstract
The idea that managerial discretion-defined as latitude of action-may be an important determinant of CEO compensation has been recognized fo r some time. However, in spite of considerable work that has implicitl y invoked related ideas on the sources of potential managerial contrib ution, a formal test of the discretion hypothesis has yet to be conduc ted. In addition, few studies have tested the performance consequences of CEO pay. In a sample of Fortune 1,000 firms, we found support for both a main effect of managerial discretion on CEO pay and a contingen cy effect, whereby firm performance is higher when discretion and pay are aligned than when they are not.