ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL REPRESENTATION

My argument is a commentary on the article by Muller, Sokol, and Overt on (Developmental Review, IS, 1998, 155-201). At issue is the dispensa bility of the concept of representation in an account of the developme nt of knowledge during infancy. My main conclusion is that an empirici st account reliant on representation conflicts with Occam's razor and so a constructivist account, which is not so reliant, is to be preferr ed. The discussion is in three parts and deals with objective knowledg e and reality; objective experience and objectivity: and objectivity w ithout representation. A final section examines some problems with con structivism. With respect to the development of knowledge during infan cy, representation is an explanandum, not an explanans. (C) 1998 Acade mic Press.