SOCIAL MOTIVES AND TRUST IN INTEGRATIVE NEGOTIATION - THE DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS OF PUNITIVE CAPABILITY

Two studies tested the effects of negotiators' social motive (cooperat ive vs. individualistic) and punitive capability (high vs. low) on tru st, negotiation behavior, and joint outcomes. On the basis of structur al goal-expectation theory (T. Yamagishi, 1986), it was predicted that in the case of a cooperative motive higher levels of punitive capabil ity lend to less trust, less exchange of information about preferences and priorities, and agreements of lower joint outcome. Study 1 (N = 4 1) supported this prediction: Cooperative negotiators had lower trust, exchanged less information, and attained lower joint outcomes under h igh rather than low punitive capability; individualistic negotiators w ere not influenced by punitive capability, presumably because they hav e low levels of trust to start with. Study 2 (N = 21) showed that thes e effects happened because higher levels of punitive capability increa se conflict avoidance in negotiators with a cooperative motive.