Economic scholarship has recently focused a great deal of attention on
the phenomenon of network externalities, or network effects: markets
in which the value that consumers place on a good increases as others
use the good. Though the economic theory of network effects is of rece
nt origin and is still not thoroughly understood, network effects incr
easingly play a role in legal argument. Judges, litigators, and schola
rs have suggested that antitrust law, intellectual property law, telec
ommunications law, Internet law, corporate law, and contract law need
to be modified to take account of network effects. Their arguments ref
lect a wide range of views about what network effects are and how cour
ts should react to them. In this Article, we explore the application o
f network economic theory in each of these contexts. We suggest ways i
n which particular legal rules should-and should not-be modified to ta
ke account of network effects. We also attempt to draw some general co
nclusions about the role of network economic theory in the legal enter
prise and about the way in which courts should revise legal doctrines
in response to theories from fields outside the law.