QUANTIFYING A STATISTICAL ASPECT OF SEGMENTED SELECTION QUOTA SYSTEMS/

We consider the problem of filling n positions from a pool of N applic ants. We assume that there exists an objective measure of each applica nt's ability-the applicant's ''score.'' Letting Q be the mean score of the n accepted applicants, we study the difference in Q as the N appl icants are stratified into It subsets, a certain number of the n accep ted applicants necessarily coming from each subset. Clearly, any accep ted group other than the top n out of N will result in a lower Q. We c onsider how the decrease in average score, Q, varies with various para meters and proportion allocations. There is no question that the issue of segmented selection (essentially, quota systems) can be controvers ial. Many argue for and many argue against using segmented selection, under such names as veteran's preference, affirmative action, and othe rs. We take no ''stand'' on this controversy. We consider solely this one statistical/quantitative aspect of the segmented selection/quota s ystem question. We believe that the results contained herein provide a useful backdrop under which the controversial aspects of the issue ca n be discussed.