DEMAND REVELATION AND TATONNEMENT AUCTIONS

Authors
Citation
P. Joyce, DEMAND REVELATION AND TATONNEMENT AUCTIONS, Journal of economic behavior & organization, 36(2), 1998, pp. 163-175
Citations number
6
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
ISSN journal
01672681
Volume
36
Issue
2
Year of publication
1998
Pages
163 - 175
Database
ISI
SICI code
0167-2681(1998)36:2<163:DRATA>2.0.ZU;2-G
Abstract
The tatonnement process is inherently a price taking process. An aucti oneer calls out a price and traders respond with a quantity signal. Th is tatonnement (groping) process contrasts with a double auction (cont inuous bid-ask) process that utilizes price signals. Do traders in thi s institution fully reveal quantity or do they underreveal affecting p rice, quantity, and efficiency? In the experiments reported here, trad ers playing against a fully revealing automaton systematically attempt to manipulate price by underrevealing quantity bid or offered. (C) 19 98 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.