In this paper we investigate the determinants of, and relationship bet
ween, wealth creation and bid resistance for a sample of 178 successfu
l takeover bids in the U.K. Within the context of an event study appro
ach we test a range of hypotheses against a background that recognizes
the existence of agency conflict and the role of corporate governance
mechanisms designed to mitigate its effect. The results obtained are
interpreted within the context of the U.K. corporate environment. We f
ind that wealth creation and bid resistance are mutually dependent on
each other. We find evidence suggesting the presence of managerial and
financial synergy but the absence of operational synergy. Our results
also suggest that there is some conflict between managers and shareho
lders but that significant monitoring is exercised by the particular g
overnance mechanisms we investigate. (C) 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Lt
d.